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E-mail address: rcushman@med.miami.edu (R. CuRobert Wood Johnson Foundation’s Project HealthDesign included funding of an ethical, legal and social
issues (ELSI) team, to serve in an advisory capacity to the nine design projects. In that capacity, the
authors had the opportunity to analyze the personal health record (PHR) and personal health application
(PHA) implementations for recurring themes. PHRs and PHAs invert the long-standing paradigm of health
care institutions as the authoritative data-holders and data-processors in the system. With PHRs and
PHAs, the individual is the center of his or her own health data universe, a position that brings new ben-
eﬁts but also entails new responsibilities for patients and other parties in the health information infra-
structure. Implications for law, policy and practice follow from this shift. This article summarizes the
issues raised by the ﬁrst phase of Project HealthDesign projects, categorizing them into four topics: pri-
vacy and conﬁdentiality, data security, decision support, and HIPAA and related legal-regulatory require-
ments. Discussion and resolution of these issues will be critical to successful PHR/PHA implementations
in the years to come.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Personal health records (PHR) have been lauded for their poten-
tial to improve the efﬁciency of healthcare and support the individ-
ual patient – ‘‘empowering” devices that ‘‘everyone should have”
[1,2]. A rapidly expanding set of organizations is offering consumers
personalized recordkeeping and support services for health-related
matters, Google andMicrosoft among them. The growing popularity
of PHRs necessitates a critical evaluation of the ethical, legal, and so-
cial issues (ELSI) they present. This article summarizes the ELSI com-
monalities observed in Project HealthDesign projects [3].
2. Common ELSI issues
There are myriad ways to partition the ELSI landscape for PHR
[4–6]. We group the discussion here into four areas: privacy and
conﬁdentiality, data security, decision support, and the legal-regu-
latory regime for health data (see Table 1).
3. Privacy and conﬁdentiality
As in the world of institutional electronic medical records
(EMR), inappropriate third-party access to PHR data is a threat toll rights reserved.
shman).individuals’ privacy. Unauthorized access and disclosure of health
information can result in insurance and employment discrimina-
tion, as well as embarrassment and other dignitary harms. PHRs
engaging in data sharing with institution-based records are partic-
ularly susceptible to leaks. While recipient institutions may in-
clude traditional insurers and healthcare providers duty-bound
by privacy law, the emergence of new often-unregulated commer-
cial actors such as websites and commercial entities elevates pri-
vacy concerns.3.1. Granular control over disclosure
One of the most appealing features of PHRs is the ability for
consumers to easily share their health data with family and other
caregivers. However, many PHRs provide limited ability to ﬁlter or
control the particular PHR data elements to be shared, even with
primary caregivers and family members. Given potential access
by several layers of entities with access to the information, this
lack of granularity-of-control poses an additional privacy concern.
Patient withholding of data from professional healthcare pro-
viders raises obvious care and liability issues. If a healthcare prac-
titioner by law or custom comes to rely on PHR data as
authoritative, any substantive omission or misstatement jeopar-
dizes the quality of care practitioners can provide. While these is-
sues already occur in the prosaic context of today’s standard intake
Table 1
Summarizing the ELSI categories and their applicability to PHRs/PHAs.
Privacy and
conﬁdentiality
 Granular control over PHR disclosure
 Ubiquitous monitoring to generate PHR data
 Cohort effects and vulnerable populations using PHRs
 Social networking reliance of PHRs
 Legal uncertainty regarding non-traditional actors
Data security  Challenges of PHR data protection in distributed
environments
Decision support  By PHAs using PHR data, provided to patients some-
times without clinical intermediaries and in extra-
clinical settings
Legal-regulatory
environment
 Multiple federal requirements and state requirements
for PHR-baseddata andnewenvironments, all evolving
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care provider and patient can exacerbate the issue.
3.2. Ubiquitous monitoring
The disclosure stakes are raised by PHRs’ potential to harvest
and store a wide range of data when paired with ambitious per-
sonal health applications (PHA). Ambitious implementations con-
template a regime of ubiquitous medical monitoring, from which
data might be ﬁltered to a PHR via multiple sensors installed in
the patient’s own house or on their body. Such comprehensive, lon-
gitudinal data acquisition potentially enhances the quality of care;
however, this could be a harbinger of round-the-clock medical sur-
veillance of the most personal and private of spaces, one’s own
body.
3.3. Cohort effects and vulnerable populations
Distinctive privacy issues arise in vulnerable populations, but
particularly here, where extensive data capture may be immortal-
ized after PHR data is migrated into a centralized store – be it an
electronic medical record (EMR) or a social networking site. Youn-
ger patients are, to generalize broadly, more comfortable sharing
personal details. Under what circumstances should minors’ data
transfers require parent/surrogate consent? Should a (perceived)
parental failure with respect to PHR data management – be it
‘‘too much” or ‘‘too little” data sharing – expose parents to social
or legal liability? The same issues obtain for elderly patients,
who might have impairments that reduce their ability to make in-
formed judgments about data collection and sharing.
3.4. Social networking
Many Project HealthDesign efforts leveraged social network-
ing as a mechanism for information-sharing, peer counseling
and general encouragement, particularly with respect to manag-
ing chronic diseases. A few were particularly dependent on
extensive self-disclosure to social networking communities,
including via cell phone use, phone texting capture, among oth-
ers. As with conventional medical histories, a range of biosen-
sor, weight and other data from the ‘‘ubiquitous” sensory
environment could be shared in social networks. Social net-
working involving information-sharing of this kind raises the
need for augmented cohort trust and conﬁdentiality, as well
as system architecture that supports it.
It is also important to note that personal health disclosures in-
clude data about or relating to family members. It is one thing to
decide to voluntarily disclose one’s own information; it is quite an-
other to reveal someone else’s stigmatizing disease or condition.
This issue will grow in importance as genetic information becomes
a greater part of patient records and enters the domain of PHRs.3.5. Legal uncertainty
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act (HITECH) has now extended some privacy and security
protections of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) to PHR providers [7,8]. Even so, PHRs and PHAs raise
still-unsettled legal questions regarding about the proper expecta-
tions, rights, and duties of the patient and any caregivers. Laws
generally cease to protect privacy if otherwise protected informa-
tion has been disclosed to another outside of a legally-recognized
duty of conﬁdentiality such as doctor–patient or attorney–client.
Laws sometimes protect even voluntarily disclosed information if
the parties have a special relationship of trust, or (in rare cases)
if the information is otherwise secret and shameful. This leaves
several conﬁdentiality uncertainties for PHR-generated data that
has been freely disclosed on, say, a social networking site. The dis-
closure may have had a speciﬁc contextual limitation with an
expectation of privacy outside of that context. But such an expec-
tation is not deemed reasonable in the current legal environment.
Online networking is essentially unregulated. Commercial pro-
viders/ISPs have no duty to users in the absence of a healthcare
provider relationship. This means a commercial provider of a social
networking site can delete information, lose information, and de-
lete a user proﬁle without repercussion or user recourse. The
stakes for such issues are raised if social networking is a critical
vehicle for health information exchange. Numerous questions re-
main regarding commercial PHR providers, where information is
collected by many with different goals. What beneﬁts can legiti-
mately accrue to the PHR provider, rather than the patient, from
such arrangements? What sorts of beneﬁts are prohibited? What
constitutes ‘‘undue inﬂuence” or ‘‘improper disclosure” in such
contexts?4. Data security
Data security issues arise in any project requiring storage or
manipulation of sensitive personal information. PHR designs often
make use of portable devices as storage and application platforms,
where the data security challenges are even more formidable. Suf-
ﬁciently robust authentication and access controls must be pro-
vided in health information settings, given the sensitivity of the
data at issue. Balancing protection against ease-of-use is one of
the greatest challenges for institutional EMRs, particularly where
EMRs are robustly networked. It is even more challenging for PHRs,
where some users may be physically and/or mentally impaired. As
noted, access limitation is inherently complex because of the range
of PHR data and the many parties who may wish (or need) to have
access to it. Segmentation of data into appropriate spheres of pro-
tection raises a considerable challenge even in an institutional EMR
world. Personalization of security, along with the other aspects of
personalization of PHRs, makes it even more difﬁcult. HITECH’s
new requirements just begin to address these issues.5. Decision support
Many Project HealthDesign PHRs feature decision support in the
form of reminder, advice and treatment recommendations. Ques-
tions concerning backup, error detection and management, faulty
input and other classic issues in decision support literature on
EMRs now recur with PHRs. Sites’ self-management tools raise
yet more issues, including appropriate use and users, the need
for human oversight and intervention, and the tolerance of various
types of predictive error. This occurs whether the decision support
is presented as authoritative (‘‘take this pill now”) or requires data
analysis by non-clinicians (patients, caregivers). It also raises is-
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risk and to whom such a duty might apply. These devices are com-
plex, so it is necessary to ask whether the average parent or guard-
ian would have the time and ability to ‘‘supervise” the decision
support when applied to a vulnerable population.
Some sites are exploring the use of embedded clinical guide-
lines in PHR-mediated decision-making. Practice guidelines as a
cornerstone of evidence-based practice lend themselves well to
decision support – while amplifying challenges related to compu-
tational decision-making and clinical assessment. Future ‘‘smart
medical homes”, also contemplated by some sites, will amplify
these issues. Automated decision support technology begs the
question of appropriate limits for patient determination of treat-
ment in a variety of diagnostic settings.
Risk disclosure could be a signiﬁcant issue from the moment
patients are presented with such platforms, even with modest
decision support functions like behavioral reminders – e.g., ‘‘exer-
cise today”! Such reminders generally raise fewer risks than, say, a
medication choice, but pose their own concerns. What if the person
is not feeling well today – and the PHR is not sophisticated enough
to detect that ‘‘condition”? It is natural to assume that such behav-
ioral reminders would be targeted at an older, sedentary popula-
tion. But calendaring and reminder systems based on activities of
daily living for the young also introduce a so-far unaddressed do-
main of inquiry regarding appropriate system use.6. Legal-regulatory requirements
The general inapplicability of today’s laws to PHRs is a concern,
especially given the ever-expanding possibilities for PHR data mis-
use with respect to potentially stigmatizing diseases, conditions
and medications. As noted, HITECH does extend some HIPAA
requirements to PHRs. Many states as well as HIPAA (modiﬁed
by HITECH) have instituted ‘‘data breach” notiﬁcation laws. These
measures also increase security requirements on organizations
that hold identiﬁable personal data.
Robust functionality for PHRs requires the ability to exchange
their data with the parties providing health services to the patient
– e.g., physicians in clinics, hospitals, pharmacies. Broad social
acceptance of PHRs requires that these exchanges are appropri-
ately protected. It is not irrational to prefer to keep information
out of institutional records if one cannot control its use and it
can be used in destructive ways – a rationality that applies to PHRs
if that content will reappear in institutional backups.
Providing a strong consent model for PHRs is not without costs.
The information in PHRs has value, for all the reasons that institu-
tional health records have value. Making PHRs attractive from a
personal privacy perspective trades off that value, albeit in ways
extremely difﬁcult to quantify. Discrimination and bias fears sug-
gest the need for laws that contemplate broader anti-discrimina-
tion and access protections, similar to the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) [9,10].
Social networking poses a great and continuing challenge
regarding privacy and conﬁdentiality. Online communities and
internet service providers are not covered entities under HIPAA,
and it is not at all clear whether they should receive such or similar
legal coverage. But if not HIPAA or HIPAA-like protections, by what
mechanism should the privacy of online community inhabitants be
protected? [11].7. Conclusion
Is a PHR best viewed as a complement to the ofﬁcial record – a
nice thing to have, with greater or lesser value depending on the
PHAs it supports? Or is a PHR a substitute for an ofﬁcial record –required in emergency situations (an electronic form of ‘‘medical
alert bracelet”) and perhaps even in routine ones as a backup to in-
ter-operable, inter-institutional EMRs? How much reliance during
a routine clinical encounter can (or should) a health practitioner
place on the data within a person’s PHR? Whatever the legal, pro-
fessional and social answers to these questions, there are technical
and cognitive constraints that limit what can be expected of the
average individual.
There is also the question of whether PHRs are a niche product
(for particular conditions/diseases) or a more general accessory
that ‘‘everyone should have”. While everyone ought to have a list
of current medications, allergies, and major past illnesses – for
themselves and for persons for whom they are responsible – that
is a rather minimal collection of data. Given the uncertainties
about how institutional PHR providers would use data, it is difﬁcult
in good conscience to recommend them to persons who have
strong preferences for privacy, instead of a simple printed list on
a piece of paper. The balance tilts towards PHRs for particular con-
ditions or diseases – those that are chronic, complex and have
hard-to-manage treatment regimes.
In general, the nine projects of Project HealthDesign have
helped make clear that: (a) the novel ways health information
can be shared and distributed in a PHR world pose signiﬁcant risks
to privacy and conﬁdentiality; (b) patients themselves play an
unprecedented role in helping to safeguard their own health infor-
mation in this new world; and (c) future PHR design and develop-
ment must take into account the health aspirations and social and
economic fears of patients.
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Appendix A. Project HealthDesign projects and some example
ELSI issues
Phase one efforts included: inter-operable ‘‘transmedia” PHR
systems for young adults; a portable PC to assist older patients in
transitional care; a PHR focused on at-risk sedentary adults; an
electronic health diary to record pain and activity data; a child-fo-
cused electronic medication manager; a PHR for those with diabe-
tes to record and upload glucose levels and other diabetes-related
indicators; a computerized ‘‘conversational assistant” to provide
patients with heart disease with a ‘‘daily check up”; and an appli-
cation to make individualized health recommendations to diabetes
patients [12].
A.1. Privacy and conﬁdentiality
A.1.1. Granular control over disclosure
Revelations from disclosures to inappropriate third parties can
be as freighted as a diagnosis of a mental disorder or a sexually
transmitted disease, or as seemingly innocuous as data about one’s
‘‘lifestyle” behaviors that have health implications. One ﬁtness-re-
lated PHR site raised concerns about inappropriately-disclosed
information regarding sedentary lifestyles, because participants
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lifestyles to future maladies. Other concerning lifestyle disclosures
included smoking, drinking and eating behaviors.
Project HealthDesign investigators reported that patients had
clear and distinct preferences between health-related data to be
shared with peers (e.g., illegal substance use) and providers (a nar-
rower list). There are clear technological obstacles to conﬁguring
role- and person-based access control in institutional data systems.
Such structuring poses serious challenges on human decision-mak-
ingbyboth systemdesigners and theultimate systemusers. Pushing
the decision burden back to the individual data subject, technology
permitting, does not solve the problem if implementing such deci-
sions exceeds the abilities (or inclinations) of the average PHR
holder.
A.1.2. Ubiquitous monitoring
One test site proposed a tablet-based medication list coordina-
tion tool, which, when paired with a PHA database, becomes an
extension of ‘‘ambient computing”, such that a potentially large
volume of data is collected. Some projects also proposed the use
of ubiquitous sensors to monitor and report the patient’s current
condition and accordingly adjust medication.
Such concerns emerge even if the data sources are not high-
tech. One site’s PDA-based data ‘‘diary” included records of daily
activities. Unlike the previous technological monitoring, this site’s
recording device is the patient himself. Self-reported data could in-
clude details of intimate behaviors, use and abuse of controlled
substances and other sensitive topics material to one’s mental
and physical health status. Memorializing such sensitive informa-
tion in a permanent record whose sharing may not be controllable
presents an additional privacy problem.
A.1.3. Cohort effects and vulnerable populations
The sites’ implementations of PHRs revealed disparities in expec-
tations of privacy and technological competence by age cohort.
Many Project HealthDesign investigators reported that children
and the elderly patients voiced fewer privacy concerns related to
the consequences of disclosing health information. Pediatric pa-
tients were more willing, even eager, to share personal health data.
This attitude, combinedwith greater technical familiaritywith com-
puting devices, seems to produce the unsurprising result that youn-
ger patients are more willing to enter all the required data to
complete a robust PHR and share this data. The elderly patients
seemed concerned more about treatment efﬁcacy than nuances of
privacy.
The appropriate range of actions by persons outside the parent–
child dyad, such as non-parent family members, and by parties
outside the family, was raised by other projects. Some sites’ PHR
implementations were explicitly designed to operate within a
school setting, leading to questions about data protection obliga-
tions of school authorities, particularly in public school settings.
A.1.4. Social networking
Several projectsmade clear that social data sharing embeds vary-
ing views regarding the scope of privacy expectations. Youthful par-
ticipants in one Project HealthDesign project were found to have
stratiﬁed privacy zones that were far more detailed than those of
other age groups. Some participants regarded privacy as incompati-
blewith authenticity. Such disparities are hard enough tomanage in
adults; with unemancipatedminors the appropriate overlay of con-
trols by a parent or guardian becomes extraordinarily difﬁcult.
A.2. Data security
Individual Project HealthDesign sites raised particular technical
questions by virtue of the speciﬁc equipment employed, particu-larly the range of portable devices. Devices included cell phones,
portable computers, portable sensors and USB storage devices.
A.3. Decision support
No site proposed a simple PHR consisting solely of static health
data. All included some sort of PHA, the information from which
provided varying levels of decision support. One Project HealthDe-
sign site included very ambitious decision support functionality re-
lated to care-planning. Another used a PHR-based ‘‘personal
assistant” involving natural language processing and decision sup-
port for ‘‘intention recognition”, which could be of nontrivial sig-
niﬁcance in disease management. Another site, using multiple
sources for monitoring data, incorporated some automated re-
sponses to data uploads, raising questions of entry error, notice/
warning triggers, among others.
One site’s interactive care-planning tool provided decision sup-
port for long-term, multi-stage treatment choices, including both
modalities and timing. By offering information and predictions
for treatment timelines and answering queries, such as ‘‘howmany
treatments do I need” and ‘‘will I be able to go on the long-planned
family vacation”, the types of decision support are varied and touch
on social concerns as well as medical decisions.
One site proposed a medication–reconciliation and scheduling
system that would be semantically linked to authoritative texts –
a kind of ‘‘electronic pill box” from which dispensing behaviors
would be triggered. Another Project HealthDesign project re-
minded pediatric patients when to take their medications and pro-
posed to incorporate automatic drug dispensing from devices
dressed up as toys. In this case, the especially vulnerable popula-
tion for whom the PHR is targeted raised particular questions
about parental competency and ‘‘fail-safe” measures. Investigators
reported that some participants feared repercussions from insurers
if it were found they failed to follow automated recommendations.
A.4. Legal-regulatory requirements
Current efforts to revise HIPAA under the auspices of the HI-
TECH present an opportunity to address PHR issues. HITECH offers
signiﬁcant incentives for health care participants to adopt ‘‘mean-
ingful use” of EMR technology, and every major vendor’s imple-
mentation of EMRs offers a PHR component. The privacy and
security elements of HITECH also focus on concerns implicit in
wider electronic health data exchange, requiring: an audit trail of
disclosure, notiﬁcation of any breaches, additional authorization
for certain uses of identiﬁable data, and strengthened enforcement
of the federal privacy and security rules. HITECH speciﬁcally ex-
tends some of these HIPAA requirements to PHRs, treating them
like ‘‘business associates” of entities covered by the law directly.
But expanding the conception of business associates’ or vendors’
responsibilities in an EMR-like context only begins to meet PHR
concerns. It extends an institutional model that only partly ﬁts
the world of PHRs and PHAs.
References
[1] American Health Information Management Association and American Medical
Informatics Association. Joint position statement for consumers of health care:
the value of personal health records. Available at <http://www.amia.org/ﬁles/
ahima-amiaphrstatement.pdf>; 2007 [accessed 14.04.10].
[2] American Health Information Management Association, MyPHR. Site at
<http://myphr.com/> [accessed 14.04.10].
[3] Project HealthDesign. Overview at <http://www.projecthealthdesign.org/
about/overview> [accessed 14.04.10].
[4] American Medical Informatics Association (AMIA). ELSI Resources. Available at
<http://www.amia.org/elsi-wg/elsi-resources> [accessed 14.04.10].
[5] Markle Foundation. Connecting Consumers: Common Framework for
Networked Personal Health Information at <http://www.connectingforhealth.
org/phti/> [accessed 14.04.10].
R. Cushman et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 43 (2010) S51–S55 S55[6] National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics of the US Department of
Health and Human Services. Enhanced protections for uses of health data: a
stewardship framework for ‘‘Secondary Uses” of electronically collected and
transmitted health data. Available at <http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov071221lt.
pdf>; 2007 [accessed 14.04.10].
[7] American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, a.k.a., ‘‘the Stimulus
Bill”). Public Law No. 111-5, Title XIII, subtitle Health Information Technology
for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act), Sections 13401ff;
2009.
[8] Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996. Public
Law No. 104-191; 1996.[9] Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008. Public Law No.
110-233; 2008.
[10] Hudson KL, Holohan MK, Collins FS. Keeping pace with the times – the genetic
information nondiscrimination act of 2008. New Engl J Med 358 (2008) 2661–3.
Available at <http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/358/25/2661> [accessed
14.04.10].
[11] Abril PS, Cava A. Health privacy in a techno-social world: a cyber-patient’s bill
of rights. New J Tech Intell Prop 6 (2008) 244. Available at <http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v6/n3/1/> [accessed 14.04.10].
[12] Project HealthDesign, 2006–2008 Projects, <http://www.projecthealthdesign.
org/projects/overview-2006_2008> [accessed 14.04.10].
